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Abstract
Background: Internet-based biosurveillance systems have been developed to detect health threats using information
available on the Internet, but system performance has not been assessed relative to end-user needs and perspectives.
Method and Findings: Infectious disease events from the French Institute for Public Health Surveillance (InVS) weekly
international epidemiological bulletin published in 2010 were used to construct the gold-standard official dataset. Data
from six biosurveillance systems were used to detect raw signals (infectious disease events from informal Internet sources):
Argus, BioCaster, GPHIN, HealthMap, MedISys and ProMED-mail. Crude detection rates (C-DR), crude sensitivity rates (C-Se)
and intrinsic sensitivity rates (I-Se) were calculated from multivariable regressions to evaluate the systems’ performance
(events detected compared to the gold-standard) 472 raw signals (Internet disease reports) related to the 86 events
included in the gold-standard data set were retrieved from the six systems. 84 events were detected before their publication
in the gold-standard. The type of sources utilised by the systems varied significantly (p,0001). I-Se varied significantly from
43% to 71% (p=0001) whereas other indicators were similar (C-DR: p=020; C-Se, p=013). I-Se was significantly associated
with individual systems, types of system, languages, regions of occurrence, and types of infectious disease. Conversely, no
statistical difference of C-DR was observed after adjustment for other variables.
Conclusion: Although differences could result from a biosurveillance system’s conceptual design, findings suggest that the
combined expertise amongst systems enhances early detection performance for detection of infectious diseases. While all
systems showed similar early detection performance, systems including human moderation were found to have a 53%
higher I-Se (p=00001) after adjustment for other variables. Overall, the use of moderation, sources, languages, regions of
occurrence, and types of cases were found to influence system performance.
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Introduction
Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases continue to pose
major threats to global health security [1,2]. The Internet provides
information that can be used to detect health threats early [3].
Epidemic intelligence (EI) relies mainly on event-based biosurveil-
lance, i.e. the ad hoc detection and interpretation of unstructured
information originating from multiple and not predefined sources
on the Internet. Sources are varied but typically include
the electronic news media and official governmental and
non-governmental organisations [4]. Internet-based biosurveil-
lance systems have been developed to monitor this large volume of
information [5]. Despite substantial inherent differences, these
systems all scan the Internet to detect reported related to infectious
disease that could represent potential health threats, and filter
unstructured information through complex algorithms. Select
relevant information is stored on dedicated web-based platforms
and disseminated. Information collected is then further filtered,
verified, and analysed by end-users (i.e. national or international
institution and stakeholders involved in EI management).
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 March 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 3 | e90536One of the limitations of event-based biosurveillance is the
difficulty of applying traditional epidemiological parameters (e.g.
sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, etc.), due to the lack
of accessible data on verified outbreaks (i.e. a gold standard). The
use of Internet-based biosurveillance systems is still maturing and its
assessment is on-going [6,7]. Most of the available scientific
literature focuses either on the assessment of biosurveillance system
performance regarding detection and adequate classification of
health-related information using informal open sources, or on the
presentation of innovative functionalities. An important topic yet to
be elucidated in the literature concerns the performance of
biosurveillance systems relative to end-user needs and expectations.
This study aims at providing a quantitative evaluation of multiple
biosurveillance systems’ performance compared to a gold-standard.
Methods
Epidemic intelligence in France
France is a medium sized country made up of metropolitan
France and eleven overseas territories scattered over Africa,
America, and Oceania. French surveillance has been focused
traditionally on the detection of unusual health events occurring
in the national territory [8,9]. In 2002 the International
Department of the French institute for public health surveillance
(InVS) developed EI to detect internationally emerging health
threats that could affect the French population living in France
and abroad [10]. The process was formalized into five steps:
detection of informal disease reports (e.g. using biosurveillance
systems), selection of disease events (through a set of defined
criteria), validation of the event (through a network of contacts,
available official information, etc.), analysis, and communication
[11].
Events targeted to the InVS public health network are
integrated into the weekly international epidemiological bulletin
(BHI) available on the InVS website every Wednesday [12]. Only
verified events are reported in the BHI, and events are usually
reported only once. Updates can occasionally be integrated but
only if major epidemiological changes occur.
Table 1. Biosurveillance systems included in the study.
System name System owner/developer Country
Starting
date Type of Moderation n languages references
Argus Georgetown University Medical Center USA 2004 Human moderation 50 [22]
BioCaster National Institute of Informatics Japan 2006 Fully automated 7 [23]
GPHIN Public Health Agency of Canada Canada 1997 Human moderation 9 [24]
HealthMap Harvard University USA 2006 Automated* 7 [25]
MedISys Joint Research Centre EU 2004 Fully automated 60 [26]
ProMED International Society of Infectious Diseases USA 1994 Human moderation 7 [27]
*Partially moderated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090536.t001
Table 2. Definition of indicators and rates.
Indicators Abrev. Definition
Crude Detected Event CDET First signal relating to a health event included in the gold-standard
Intrinsically Detected Event IDET First signal detected primarily by the system (excluding signal originating from another system included in the
study)
Not-Detected Event NDET1 Event not detected by the system
NDET2 Event not detected by the system or not primarily detected by the system
Crude True Positive event CTP First signal related to an event included in the gold-standard and detected by a system before the reporting of
the event in the BHI
Intrinsic True Positive event ITP First signal related to an event included in the gold-standard, detected by a system before its reporting in the
BHI and primarily detected by the system
False Negative FN1 Event not detected by the system before its reporting in the BHI
FN2 Event not detected by the system before its reporting in the BHI or not detected primarily by the system
Rates Abrev. Definition
Crude Detection Rate C-DR Ability of a system to detect confirmed infectious disease outbreaks. C-DR=(C-DET)/(CDET+NDET1)
Intrinsic Detection Rate I-DR Ability of a system to detect confirmed infectious disease outbreaks independently from other systems. I-DR=
(IDET+NDET2)
Crude Sensitivity Rate C-Se Ability of a system to detect confirmed infectious disease outbreaks prior to the publication in the BHI. C-
Se=(CTP)/(CTP+FN1).
Intrinsic Sensitivity Rate I-Se Ability of a system to detect confirmed infectious disease outbreaks independently from other systems and
before their publication in the BHI. I-Se=(ITP)/(ITP+FN2)).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090536.t002
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Events. Events were defined as a verified infectious disease
occurrence resulting from the EI process (i.e. including verification
and analysis). Events were defined by the disease, the type of cases
(human or animal), the country, the province or state, and the
month of occurrence regardless of the number of cases concerned.
All events are considered to be independent.
Signals. Signals were defined as unverified raw infectious
disease information (in relation to an event included in the gold-
standard data set) collected from biosurveillance systems (informal
sources). Biosurveillance systems are therefore a source of signal,
but are not the source of the events included in the BHI (i.e. gold-
standard data set).
Biosurveillance systems are used only for the detection of
signals. Once selected signals are fully processed (i.e. systematically
verified, analysed, characterised, etc.), signals can be classified as
an ‘‘event’’ or ‘‘discarded’’. If biosurveillance systems are the main
sources of signals, in the EI process they are not the ‘‘source of the
event’’.
Gold-Standard. Ideally, infectious disease signals identified
by Internet biosurveillance methods should be compared to official
event reports (gold-standard) during the same time period. The EI
performed at InVS, for which necessary information (rational,
selection and validation processes, etc.) was readily accessible, was
chosen as the best source of gold-standard data for this study.
Infectious disease events (human cases and zoonosis epizootics)
reported in the BHI in 2010 were included in the gold-standard
data set. A/H5N1 influenza has been considered a health threat
for a long time though it is subject to substantial under-reporting
[13]. Hence, A/H5N1 cases were excluded from the study.
Non-infectious disease events, not systematically monitored by all
systems, were also excluded from our study.
Biosurveillance Systems. Six biosurveillance systems con-
tributing to the Early Alerting and Reporting (EAR) project
launched under the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) [14]
were used to detect raw signals (informal reports of infectious
disease): Argus, BioCaster, GPHIN, HealthMap, MedISys and
ProMED (Table 1). Of those, three are fully moderated (i.e.
include human analysts in the selection, sorting and/or translation
processes) while the remaining three systems are based mainly on
automated processes for detection, sorting, and translation (Table
1).
Data. Signals relating to events included in the gold-standard
data set were retrospectively searched on all six biosurveillance
systems through ad hoc queries using keywords or a series of
keywords. Searches were performed by two InVS epidemiologists
(i.e. independent from the six biosurveillance systems). Discordant
pairs were reviewed and the most relevant signal was kept in the
final database.
Rates. The crude detection rate (C-DR) was defined as the
ability of a system to detect an infectious disease event, the intrinsic
detection rate (I-DR) was defined as the ability of a system to
detect outbreaks independently from other systems. The crude
sensitivity rate (C-Se) was defined as the ability of a system to
detect outbreaks prior to their publication in the BHI. The
intrinsic sensitivity rate (I-Se) was defined as the ability of a system
to detect outbreaks independently from other systems and before
their publication in the BHI (see table 2 for details).
Associated factors. Bivariable and multivariable modified
Poisson regressions (well suited to produce rate ratios) were used to
Figure1. Type and geographical distribution of events published in the BHI in 2010.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090536.g001
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confidence intervals (CI) and p values were computed to assess
the strength of these associations. The same variables were
included in the different regression models. Potential interactions
were tested for their significance at the 005 level. All analyses were
performed using Stata 12.1 (StataCorp LP, USA).
Results
Gold-Standard
In 2010, 132 events were reported in the BHI. 46 (35%) were
excluded (26 global overviews or long-lasting events, 12 follow-ups
of previously reported events and 8 non-infectious health
occurrences). The 86 events included in the gold-standard data
set occurred in 46 countries; 23 (27%) in the Americas, 22 (25%) in
Africa, 17 (20%) in Europe, 14 (16%) in Asia and 10 (12%) in
Near-East and North-Africa (Figure 1). Twenty-two disease events
were identified. West Nile virus (WNV) infection and dengue
infections represented 21% (n=18) and 14% (n=12) of the events,
respectively. Important variations were observed according to the
region of occurrence, e.g. WNV infection represented 76% of
events reported in Europe, 50% in the North-Africa and Near-
East, but none of the events reported in America or in Asia
(Table 3).
Signals Detected
A total of 472 raw signals relating to events included in the gold-
standard data set were retrieved from the six biosurveillance
systems. The language of the initial source was English for 53%
(n=249), Spanish for 15% (n= 72), French for 11% (n=53) and
other languages for 20% (n=94). The remaining 4 events were
detected through several sources in different languages and
information was insufficient to rank them. Language sources
varied according to the systems (p=0.063) and to the region of
occurrence of the event (p,0.001). All 86 events included in the
gold-standard data set were detected by at least one of the systems
and 57 (66%) were detected by all six systems. When early
detection was considered, 84 (98%) events were detected before
their publication in the BHI, 30 (35%) were detected by the six
systems, 26 (30%) by five systems, 10 (12%) by four systems, 7 (8%)
by three systems, 6 (7%) by two systems, 5 (6%) by a single system
and 2 events (2%) were not detected prior to their publication in
the BHI. According to the system the proportion of media sources
utilised by the systems ranged from 44% to 73%, official sources
from 6% to 32%. Raw signals originating from another system
included in the study ranged from 1% to 49% (p,0.001) (Table 4).
The systems’ C-DR ranged from 83% to 95% (p=020), I-DR
ranged from 47% to 92% (p,0.001), C-Se ranged from 71% to
85%% (p=013), and I-Se ranged from 43% to 71% (p=0001)
(Table 5).
Table 3. Nature and geographic distribution of events reported in InVS weekly international bulletin (BHI), 2010.
Diseases America
Sub-Saharan
Africa Asia Europe
North-Africa
Middle-East Total
n % n% n% n % n% n%
West Nile - - - - - - 13 (76%) 5 (50%) 18 (21%)
Dengue 4 (17%) 4 (18%) 2 (14%) 1 (6%) 1 (10%) 12 (14%)
Cholera 5 (22%) 1 (5%) 4 (29%) - - - - 10 (12%)
Rift Valley Fever - - 6 (27%) - - - - 2 (20%) 8 (9%)
Yellow fever - - 6 (27%) - - - - - - 6 (7%)
Poliomyelitis - - 1 (5%) 4 (29%) 1 (6%) - - 6 (7%)
Chikungunya - - 2 (9%) 1 (7%) - - - - 3 (3%)
Plague 2 (9%) 1 (5%) - - - - - - 3 (3%)
Malaria - - - - - - 2 (12%) 1 (10%) 3 (3%)
Saint Louis enc. 2 (9%) - - - - - - - - 2 (2%)
Mayaro 2 (9%) - - - - - - - - 2 (2%)
Measles 2 (9%) - - - - - - - - 2 (2%)
Venezuelan Eq. Enc. 2 (9%) - - - - - - - - 2 (2%)
Eastern Eq. Enc. 1 (4%) - - - - - - - - 1 (1%)
Oropuche 1 (4%) - - - - - - - - 1 (1%)
Crimean–Congo HF - - - - 1 (7%) - - - - 1 (1%)
Nipah - - - - 1 (7%) - - - - 1 (1%)
Alkhurma - - - - - - - - 1 (10%) 1 (1%)
Influenza 1 (4%) - - - - - - - - 1 (1%)
Typhoid - - - - 1 (7%) - - - - 1 (1%)
Diphtheria 1 (4%) - - - - - - - - 1 (1%)
Anthrax - - 1 (5%) - - - - - - 1 (1%)
Total 23 (100%) 22 (100%) 14 (100%) 17 (100%) 10 (100%) 86 (100%)
Eq. Enc. = Equine encephalitis HF = Haemorrhagic fever.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090536.t003
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Types source Argus BioCaster GPHIN HealthMap MedISys ProMED Total p value
n% n% n% n% n% n% n%
Media
1 53 67% 35 44% 66 93% 40 49% 42 52% 58 73% 294 62%
Systems * 1 1% 39 49% 1 1% 32 39% 33 41% 1 1% 107 23% ,0.001
Official
# 25 32% 5 6% 4 6% 10 12% 6 7% 21 26% 71 15%
Total 79 100% 79 100% 71 100% 82 100% 81 100% 80 100% 472 100%
Languages Argus BioCaster GPHIN HealthMap MedISys ProMED Total p value
n% n% n% n% n% n% n%
English 37 49% 46 49% 33 46% 39 48% 51 63% 43 54% 249 53%
Spanish 7 9% 11 9% 12 17% 16 20% 8 10% 18 23% 72 15%
French 9 12% 6 12% 11 15% 7 9% 8 10% 12 15% 53 11%
Russian 7 9% 4 9% 4 6% 8 10% 4 5% 3 4% 30 6% 0.063
Portuguese 1 1% 4 1% 5 7% 7 9% 3 4% 2 3% 22 5%
Other 14 19% 8 19% 6 8% 5 6% 7 9% 2 3% 42 9%
Total 75 100% 79 100% 71 100% 82 100% 81 100% 80 100% 468 100%
Regions of
occurrence Argus BioCaster GPHIN HealthMap MedISys ProMED Total p value
n% n% n% n% n% n% n%
Sub-Sah. Afr
£ 22 28% 21 27% 20 28% 21 26% 22 27% 22 28% 128 27%
America 16 20% 21 27% 19 27% 22 27% 22 27% 22 28% 122 26%
Europe 17 22% 15 19% 11 15% 17 21% 15 19% 16 20% 91 19% 1.00
Asia 14 18% 14 18% 14 20% 14 17% 14 17% 14 18% 84 18%
N. Afr.- M.East 10 13% 8 10% 7 10% 8 10% 8 10% 6 8% 47 10%
Total 79 100% 79 100% 71 100% 82 100% 81 100% 80 100% 472 100%
Types of disease Argus BioCaster GPHIN HealthMap MedISys ProMED Total p value
n% n% n% n% n% n% n%
Encephalitis 23 29% 19 24% 16 23% 22 27% 19 23% 18 23% 117 25%
Dengue-like 16 20% 21 27% 15 21% 20 24% 21 26% 20 25% 113 24%
VHF
¥ 79 %79 %71 0 % 79 %79 %79 %4 2 9 %1 . 0 0
Diarrhoeal 10 13% 10 13% 11 15% 10 12% 10 12% 11 14% 62 13%
Other 23 29% 22 28% 22 31% 23 28% 24 30% 24 30% 138 29%
Total 79 100% 79 100% 71 100% 82 100% 81 100% 80 100% 472 100%
Types of case Argus BioCaster GPHIN HealthMap MedISys ProMED Total p value
n% n% n% n% n% n% n%
Human 64 81% 67 85% 61 86% 68 83% 70 86% 68 85% 398 84%
Animal 15 19% 12 15% 10 14% 14 17% 11 14% 12 15% 74 16% 0.94
Total 79 100% 79 100% 71 100% 82 100% 81 100% 80 100% 472 100%
Regions of
occurrence English Spanish French Russian Portuguese Other Total p value
n% n% n% n% n% n% n%
Sub-Sah. Afr
£ 75 30% 1 1% 44 83% 3 10% 1 5% 3 7% 127 27%
America 51 20% 46 64% 2 4% 0 0% 20 91% 1 2% 120 26%
Europe 52 21% 21 29% 1 2% 9 30% 1 5% 7 17% 91 19% ,0.001
Asia 45 18% 4 6% 1 2% 15 50% 0 0% 18 43% 83 18%
N. Afr.- N.East 26 10% 0 0% 5 9% 3 10% 0 0% 13 31% 47 10%
Total 249 100% 72 100% 53 100% 30 100% 22 100% 42 100% 468 100%
1Media = Press, news aggregators and blogs.
* Systems = another biosurveillance system included in the study.
#Official = official sources and expert contributions.
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`
`Factors associated with Crude or Intrinsic detection
In the bivariable regression analysis individual systems, moder-
ation of system, languages, regions of occurrence, types of disease,
and types of case were significantly associated (Table 6). No
significant differences were observed across and within systems for
C-DR; I-DR and I-Se varied significantly across and within
systems; one system (HealthMap) showed a significantly higher C-
Se than moderated systems, but across systems the difference was
not significant (p=0.13) (Table 5).
From the multivariable Poisson regression models, no statistical
difference in C-Se was observed after adjustment for individual
systems, moderation, languages, types of diseases, regions of
occurrence, and type of cases. Conversely, systems, moderation,
languages, regions of occurrence, and types of disease were all
significantly associated with I-Se (Table 7). Potential interactions
were tested, and none were found significant at the 0.05 level.
Discussion
The systems’ characteristics (type of moderation, sources
accessed, diseases, languages, and regions covered) were found
to significantly influence disease detection performance. This
highlights the differences in conceptual design used to develop the
biosurveillance systems, and the importance of taking advantage of
synergies through combining systems’ data for infectious diseases
detection.
C-DR was used to evaluate the global detection rate indepen-
dently from the EI quality and type. With C-DR values ranging
from 83% to 95%, all systems were found to have a similar ability
to detect infectious events, findings consistent with other studies
[23-34]. However, C-DR is a very crude indicator that does not
take into consideration the main EI objective of early detection.
C-Se provides a better estimation of the systems’ ability to detect
infectious diseases outbreaks early in a given framework defined by
the chosen gold-standard. Although biosurveillance systems were
originally designed to detect relevant information though informal
sources, they now include a noteworthy proportion of early
released official information. C-Se of early published official
information was 27% lower than C-Se of media sources (p=0001)
underlining the usefulness of media sources in the detection of
communicable diseases outbreaks. Despite their different concep-
tual designs and notably the type of sources used, all systems
demonstrated remarkably similar early detection capacities as C-
Table 5. Detection, sensitivity rates and rate ratios from bivariable Poisson regressions
Argus BioCaster GPHIN HealthMap MedISys ProMED p value
Crude Detection CDET 79 79 71 82 81 80 0.20
C-DR 92% 92% 83% 95% 94% 93%
RR - 1.00 0.90 1.04 1.03 1.01
CI - 0.91–1.09 0.80–1.00 0.95–1.12 0.94–1.11 0.92–1.10
p value - 1.00 0.07 0.35 0.55 0.77
Intrinsic Detection IDET 78 40 70 50 48 79 ,0.001
IDR 91% 47% 81% 58% 56% 92%
RR 1.11 0.57 - 0.71 0.69 1.13
CI 0.99–1.26 0.45–0.73 - 0.58–0.88 0.55–0.85 1.00–1.27
p value 0.08 ,0.001 - 0.001 0.001 0.05
Crude Sensitivity CTP 61 63 62 73 67 62 0.13
C-Se 71% 73% 72% 85% 78% 72%
RR 0.84 0.86 0.85 - 0.92 0.85
CI 0.71–0.98 0.73–1.00 0.72–0.99 - 0.79–1.05 0.72–0.99
p value 0.03 0.06 0.04 - 0.24 0.04
Intrinsic Sensitivity ITP 60 37 62 43 44 61 0.001
I-Se 70% 43% 72% 50% 51% 71%
RR 0.98 0.61 1.02 0.70 0.72 -
CI 0.81–1.19 0.46–0.80 0.84–1.23 0.55–0.91 0.56–0.92 -
p value 0.87 ,0.001 0.87 0.006 0.01 -
RR= Rate Ratio; CI= 95% confidence interval.
None of the system can be considered as a reference and similar results were found using different combinations. For the table, moderated systems were alternatively
chosen (alphabetic order) as reference and HealthMap was selected as the reference for CTP to improve readability.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090536.t005
Table 4. Cont.
£Sub-Sah. Afr = Sub-Saharan Africa.
N. Afr.- N.East = North Africa and Near-East.
¥VHF = Viral Haemorrhagic Fever.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090536.t004
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`Se remained comparable even after adjusting for other variables
(p=013).
A high level of cross-feeding (i.e., a system using another fellow
system as a source) was documented, further emphasising the
synergistic qualities of the systems. For automated systems, 39% of
early detected signals were collected from another system versus
1% for moderated systems (p,0001). I-Se provides an appropriate
proxy to assess a system’s detection rate. Individually (data not
shown) and collectively (Table 6) moderated systems were found to
have a 53% higher I-Se (p,0001) than automated systems after
adjustment for the other variables included in the model. This
increased I-Se of moderated systems can be attributed directly to
their common characteristic: the human moderation. The
difficulties met by the systems in developing an efficient algorithm
covering the different facets of a single disease have been
demonstrated by a previous study [7]. Hence, our study illustrates
the significant added value resulting from the input of human
analysts and their ability to balance the limits inherent to a fully
automated detection. Yet, I-Se should be considered as a lower
limit, because for each system only the first detected signal was
considered. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that some signals
primarily collected via a fellow system may have been later
detected through another source, but still earlier than the gold-
standard. All systems integrate a de-duplication module, aiming at
reducing the volume of redundant information; de-duplication
performance varies according to systems. A consistent collection of
the second detected signals was not possible across all systems, and
the weight of this potential bias cannot be estimated.
At the time of the study, none of the systems were able to detect
early all events included in the gold-standard data set, substan-
tiating the necessity for end-users to use several systems in parallel.
The purpose of cross-feeding is to increase sensitivity by utilising
all available pieces of information. However, such cross-feeding
matters when several systems are used in parallel. In a previous
study, some authors documented that major EI stakeholders
routinely accessed four to seven different systems for event
detection [7]. In this context, cross-feeding generates a substantial
level of duplication for end-users. In the current study, 43% of
signals detected by automated systems would have already been
seen on a fellow system. This stresses the importance of developing
a common tool that would combine system outputs and
specificities while reducing duplication.
Overall 97% of detected signals were published in seven
languages (English, Spanish, French, Russian, Portuguese, Arabic
Table 6. Factors associated with crude or intrinsic detection from bivariable Poisson regressions.
Crude detection Intrinsic detection
RR 95% CI p value p value RR 95% CI p value p value
Systems ProMED - - - - - -
Argus 0.98 0.81–1.19 0.87 0.98 0.81–1.19 0.87
BioCaster 1.02 0.85–1.22 0.86 0.61 0.46–0.80 0.00
Gphin 1.00 0.83–1.20 1.00 0.131 1.02 0.84–1.23 0.87 ,0.001
HealthMap 1.18 1.00–1.38 0.04 0.70 0.55–0.91 0.01
MedISys 1.08 0.91–1.29 0.38 0.72 0.56–0.92 0.01
Moderation of systems Automated - - - - - - - -
Moderated 0.91 0.82–1.01 0.07 - 1.48 1.27–1.71 0.0001 -
Types of diseases Encephalitis - - - - - -
Dengue-like 1.15 0.97–1.36 0.12 1.16 0.91–1.48 0.22
VHF
¥ 1.45 1.23–1.71 ,0.001 ,0.001 1?69 1.33–2.15 ,0.001 ,0.001
Diarrhoeal 1.39 1.18–1.63 ,0.001 1.73 1.40–2.15 ,0.001
Others 1.30 1.12–1.52 0.001 1.33 1.07–1.66 0.01
Regions of occurrence America - - - - - -
Sub-Sah. Afr
£ 1?16 1?02–1?33 0?03 1?33 1?09–1?63 0?01
Europe 0?90 0?75–1?08 0?24 ,0?001 1?02 0?80–1?31 0?85 ,0?001
Asia 1?27 1?12–1?45 ,0?001 1?57 1?29–1?91 ,0?0001
N. Afr.-N.East 0?94 0?76–1?16 0?55 0?92 0?67–1?26 0?61
Types of case Human - - - - - - - -
Animal 0.72 0.59–0.86 ,0.001 - 0.77 0.61–0.97 0.03 -
Types of source Media
1 -- - - - - -
Systems * 0.86 0.77–0.97 0.01 0.001 - - - -
Official
# 0.79 0.67–0.92 0.004 - - - -
RR= Rate Ratio; 95% CI= 95% confidence interval.
1Media = Press, news aggregators and blogs.
* Systems = another biosurveillance system included in the study.
#Official = official and expert contributions.
£Sub-Sah. Afr = Sub-Saharan Africa.
N. Afr.- N.East = North Africa and Near-East.
¥ VHF = Viral Haemorrhagic Fever.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090536.t006
Performance of Biosurveillance Systems
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 March 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 3 | e90536
`
`and Chinese), findings consistent with another study [16].These
languages were the first integrated by the systems and as such the
linguistic methodology (i.e. ontology) might be better developed
for those languages than for languages incorporated more recently.
Signals in all languages incorporated in the systems were
systematically considered. Yet, it cannot be formally excluded
that it might have been easier for analysts to detect information
published in English, French, Spanish, or Portuguese than in
information published in languages requiring systematic transla-
tion (e.g., Arabic, Chinese) or rarely used. Despite this potential
bias, the results underline the importance of multiple languages
tools.
The lack of recognised and consistently available reference
sources across diseases and regions represents a major challenge to
the evaluation of EI and biosurveillance systems [17,18]. The
choice of the gold-standard for this study (BHI) might have
impacted the results. The disease and the location of occurrence
are among the selection criteria used for EI at InVS. Events
occurring in an area close to a French territory were more likely to
be retained. Arboviruses represent a risk of exportation especially
in overseas territories where competent vectors are present [19], as
illustrated in 2006 by the outbreak of chikungunya virus, which
affected over one third of the population of both Reunion and
Mayotte islands [20]. For France, the circulation of major
arthropod-borne infections in previously non-endemic areas is
perceived as a threat to the blood supply, and therefore is a topic
of high interest. This may partially explain both the high
proportion (64%) of vector-borne diseases among reported events
and the specific attention placed on those events. For instance,
2010 was a year marked by unprecedented WNV circulation in
the Mediterranean area [21] and all 18 WNV infection events
reported in 2010 occurred in Mediterranean countries not
previously considered as endemic. Hence, other EI stakeholders,
with different objectives or disease distribution, would certainly
select different events resulting in another gold-standard data set.
The performance of the EI process might also affect the results.
Unfortunately, in the absence of a recognised international gold-
standard, the sensitivity of the chosen gold-standard could not be
assessed. This assessment should be carried out, but was beyond
the current studies objectives. Although, these results are not fully
representative, France’s large geographic distribution (spread over
four continents) and systematic and stable approach to EI suggest
that the results from this study provide a larger overview that can
be transposed to other contexts. Others studies using other gold-
standards should be implemented to better assess and ensure
generalizability of the results.
The number of events included in the gold-standard was too
limited to allow stratified analysis and may have undermined
potential associations. For example, it is likely that some systems
might have developed specific competences in specific languages,
for certain geographic regions, or specific diseases, but this aspect
could not be explored since biosurveillance systems are in constant
evolution, and as such, the short time frame was chosen to limit
intra-system variability. An extended study time period to generate
more disease events could be considered for a future study.
The retrospective search for information might have influenced
the results. In a previous study, authors found that prospective
detection rates were 17% lower than the retrospective sensitivity
rate [7]. However; this bias applies equally to all systems and does
not affect the overall findings. Similarly, in this study no significant
difference (p=0.53) was found between the two InVS epidemi-
ologists suggesting that the user-bias was limited.
Table 7. Factors associated with crude or intrinsic detection from multivariable Poisson regression models.
Crude detection Intrinsic Detection
Variable RR 95% CI p value RR 95% CI p value
Types of System Automated - - - - - -
Moderated 0.96 0.88–1.04 0.27 1.53 1.34–1.75 ,0.001
Languages of detection English - - - - - -
Spanish 1.10 0.96–1.27 0.18 1.22 0.99–1.51 0.06
French 0.99 0.86–1.14 0.93 1.06 0.85–1.33 0.58
Other 1.08 0.98–1.20 0.13 1.21 1.01–1.44 0.04
Regions of occurrence America - - - - - -
Sub-Sah. Afr
£ 1.10 0.95–1.28 0.20 1.25 0.98–1.60 0.07
Europe 0.95 0.79–1.13 0.54 1.18 0.91–1.52 0.22
Asia 1.09 0.97–1.24 0.15 1.30 1.07–1.59 0.01
N. Afr.-N.East 1.16 0.98–1.37 0.08 1.15 0.86–1.53 0.35
Types of disease Encephalitis - - - - - -
Dengue-like 0.95 0.80–1.12 0.53 1.11 0.84–1.47 0.46
VHF
¥ 1.06 0.86–1.31 0.60 1.39 0.99–1.94 0.06
Diarrheal 1.09 0.91–1.30 0.34 1.55 1.16–2.06 0.003
Other 1.01 0.85–1.21 0.90 1.14 0.87–1.49 0.33
Types of cases Human - - - - - -
Animal 0.84 0.68–1?02 0.08 1.08 0.84–1.37 0.55
RR= Rate Ratio; 95% CI= 95% confidence interval.
£Sub-Sah. Afr = Sub-Saharan Africa.
N. Afr.- N.East = North Africa and Near-East.
¥VHF = Viral Haemorrhagic Fever.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090536.t007
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`
`In conclusion, infectious diseases, environmental issues, and
potential bioterrorist threats will continue to pose major risks for
global health security and epidemic intelligence is now an essential
component of early warning systems. Overall, the systems’ disease
detection capabilities are complementary (synergistic) with dem-
onstrated timeliness and sensitivity [7]. The output from these
systems and also the expertise of the public health institutions
responsible for EI should be pooled for optimal early detection.
Internet biosurveillance systems have evolved substantially;
sufficient data is now available to implement robust validation
studies using epidemiological approaches against an official
comparison data set. Moreover, larger scope studies should be
implemented that would prospectively involve major stakeholders,
increase the number of epidemiologists involved, and enable
implementation of innovative strategies to pool the expertise
developed by the different systems. Especially, a more robust
composite gold-standard that pools information and expertise
from national and international institutions in charge of EI
activities should be developed.
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